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This paper investigates inflation in Bahrain during the period of the Arab Spring to 
determine effect of unrest on general and relative prices.  We find first that the GDP deflator 
alone measures inflation in Bahrain; the CPI measures the cost of living only.  Additionally, 
oil prices, the U.S. dollar’s trade-weighted value, and government price intervention are 
highly correlated with price movements. Disaggregated monthly CPI data reveal the onset of 
unrest is correlated with movements in several components of the CPI index, but the Arab 
Spring had its most direct and lasting causal effect solely on the housing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates money and inflation in the Kingdom of Bahrain with a focus 
on the period of the Arab Spring (AS), 2011-13, to determine the effects of social 
unrest on general and relative prices.  The amount of research on the economies of 
the Middle East and the Arab world has expanded lately, especially in light of the 
AS. In addition to our own work on the effect of the AS on employment and output 
in Bahrain (Miller & Epstein, 2015), researchers have recently investigated the 
effects of unrest in the Middle East in general on stocks (e.g. Abdelbaki, 2013; 
Chau, Deesomak & Wung, 2014; Bouri, 2013), banking (e.g.  Jackowicz & 
Kowalewski, 2013; Kim, 2013; Thalassinos et al., 2013), unemployment (Campante 
& Chor, 2012), and output (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013).   The issues of money 
and monetary policy in Bahrain have been addressed by Jusof, Al Wosabi & Majid 
(2009), Darrat and Al-Sowaidi (2009), Espinoza and Prasad (2012),  Hojjat & 
Barnhorst (2013).  Narrowing the focus to the connection between unrest and prices, 
Dube & Vargas (2013) is representative of analyzes that consider the unrest 
provoked by price movements.  In this paper we reverse the analysis and consider 
what changes in general or relative price might have occurred as a result of the 
unrest.  To do so we have organized the paper as follows.  We begin by investigating 
the measurement and co-movement of two inflation indicators – the GDP Deflator 
and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) - over the period 1990-2011, followed by an 
analysis of the specific movements in the two indexes to determine what non-
monetary factors may play a role in the movement of general prices both over time 
and in short periods of uncertainty in Bahrain.  Third, we look at disaggregated 
monthly CPI data just before and then during the AS to determine the effect on 
prices in various consumer sectors of Bahrain, if any, of the onset of social 
upheaval.  The last part sets out our conclusions.  
 
2. The Nature and Movement of Inflation Indicators over Time 
 
To understand the movement of prices during the Arab Spring we must first 
determine exactly what the two dominant inflation indexes are capturing.  Once 
done we can then track the movement of the two before and during the AS to 
discover any causal connection between prices and social unrest.  In 2007 Tahir and 
Samad applied Vector Autoregression to five macroeconomic variables in the 
Bahraini economy, including the CPI.  However, since then changes have been 
made in the reporting of inflation figures, which provide analysts with advantages 
and disadvantages.  The monthly reporting of disaggregated data does allow us to 
look more deeply into the relation of money and prices over shorter periods of time, 
yet we are constrained in what we can do from a sophisticated statistical standpoint 
because of data limitations.  While Annual Consumer Price Index figures using a 
consistent base year (2006) go back to 1990, the database of consistent monthly 
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Headline Rates of consumer inflation is quite limited, covering the period since 
August 2007 only.  Disaggregated CPI data by consumer sector is even more 
limited, dating back to January 2009.   
 
Data on the GDP deflator on an annual basis go back to 1989, but the base year was 
changed in 2011 from 2001 to 2010. The transition to a new base year was coupled 
with a redefinition of nominal GDP by the Central Informatics Office (CIO), but 
recalculated time-series data were limited to the period since 2006 only.  Thus, to 
create a consistent time series of deflator values for the period 1990-2013 we had to 
couple the actual deflator data reported under the 2001 base year for 1990-2006 with 
an imputed value of that deflator for the period 2007-13.  We did so by applying 
each additional year’s GDP inflation in the new 2010 series to the previous year’s 
deflator based on 2001.  The resultant time series of annual CPI and Deflator data 
appear in the appendix.
2
  
 
A cursory analysis of the time series data of the two inflation measures raises several 
issues immediately.  Not only do the two series have values that are quite different 
in various years, the signs of the two indicators are dissimilar in a surprising number 
of cases.   It is also clear that average rates of inflation of the two indicators are 
inconsistent, 1.0% for the CPI and 3.5% for the deflator, with differing variances of 
0.07% and 0.4% respectively.  A correlation analysis of the two for the period 1991-
2013 results in a coefficient that is surprising: -0.13. This value is not statistically 
significantly different from zero so we can conclude that the two inflation measures 
are essentially uncorrelated. Some variation is expected considering the breadth of 
the deflator compared to the market basket for the consumer sector, but the complete 
lack of correlation is surprising.
3
  Taking U.S. time-series data as reported in FRED 
of the St. Louis Federal Reserve as a benchmark, the correlation coefficient between 
the CPI and Implicit Deflator in the period 1989-2013 is 0.875; since 1948 it is an 
even higher 0.95.   
 
Given these two descriptions we must determine which indicator, if either, truly 
measures inflation over this 22-year period.  Then we can speculate on why the 
other does not and why it might better be thought of as capturing the cost of living. 
To make this determination we will use the quantity theory of money relationship 
between changes in general prices, P, the levels of real GDP (y), nominal GDP (Py), 
and the velocity of money, V. 
 
                                                           MV = Py 
 
                                                      ln(MV) = ln(Py) 
                                                 
2
 For an analysis of the reliability of data issued in Bahrain, see Miller & Epstein, 2011. 
3
 The components of the deflator and the CPI market basket appear in the Appendix II.   
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                                          lnM + lnV = lnP + lny 
 
                                lnMt + lnVt = lnPt + lnyt , or 
 
                                  %ΔM + %ΔV = %ΔP + %Δy, thus 
 
                                      %ΔP = %ΔM + %ΔV - %Δy 
 
Each of the components of the analysis can have growth rates whose values are 
positive, negative, or zero.  For this analysis we use the values on an annual basis of 
real GDP, money stock M1 and M2, velocity, CPI, and the GDP deflator starting in 
1990 and ending in 2011, the year of the onset of social unrest. In addition to using 
GDP figures from the CIO website we accessed money stock figures from the 
Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB). We then calculated the 
continuously compounded annual growth rate (CCAGR) for each component, the 
results of which appear in Table 1. 
 
The results are clear for both money stock indicators.  The rate of inflation implied 
by the behaviour of money, velocity and output much more closely tracks the 
deflator than it does the CPI, and the difference from the CPI is substantial.  While 
both the deflator and the CPI are computed using standard price index methods the 
amount of price movement reported over time in the CPI is so small relative to the 
behaviour of money that we suspect that retail prices may not permitted to move. 
This divergence leads us to conclude that we must make an important distinction 
between these two indexes – only one is capturing the level of inflation while the 
other is capturing instead the cost of living.  Insights on this distinction in terms of 
U.S. data appear in a series of blog posts on the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
website (Bryan, 2014).  The notion of inflation is one of a sustained upward 
movement in the general price level, shared by most components of the index, and 
related to growth of money vis-à-vis the growth of real GDP over time.  In short, 
inflation over time is a monetary phenomenon. The cost of living to Bryan “is a 
description of how difficult it is to buy a particular level of well-being” (Bryan, 
2014, Part 2).  The movement in prices is consistent with Bryan’s dichotomy, thus 
we conclude that the deflator is a valid representation of inflation in Bahrain and the 
CPI must be capturing instead the cost of living.  
 
To further solidify this dichotomy we looked for any practice of price setting and 
subsidization by the government.  While the practices are not readily available on 
the CIO website we were able to communicate with a staff member at the CIO to get 
the following list of commodities that either have their price set by the government 
or the government subsidizes the commodities in whole or in part:  
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 Consumer petrol 
 One brand each, set price per kilogram, of chicken, fresh/chilled beef, and 
fresh/chilled goat meat (other brands not controlled) 
 Electricity, water and gas 
 Medicinal drugs, with prices revised every six months 
 Wheat flour 
 Health and education services provided to citizens at no charge 
 
These items are components of four of the divisions of the CPI consumer market 
basket, dampening the inflationary effects on 53.75% of the total market basket. In 
every case the government attempts to keep prices stable, reducing the swings in the 
cost of living that could occur due to inflationary or deflationary pressures.  The 
swings in prices can be aggravated not only by monetary developments within 
Bahrain but also by the changing value of the US dollar to which the Bahraini dinar 
is pegged.  Considering how little the CPI is rising over time the government has 
been successful in shielding consumers from the price shocks that can come from 
changes in the trade-weighted value of the dinar/dollar and in oil prices.  To 
establish the role played by the dollar, energy prices and the various consumer 
sectors in price movements we can further analyze the deflator and the CPI before 
and during the social unrest. 
 
3. The Behaviour of Inflation and the Cost of Living during the Arab Spring 
 
To determine if general prices were affected in an unusual way during the Arab 
Spring we must first set out the movement of the price indexes in the years before 
for which we have comparable data along with the movements from 2011-13. To 
compare the deflator to the CPI requires that we use quarterly data only given that 
the deflator is reported solely with the quarterly non-annualized GDP figures.  We 
computed a quarterly CPI using monthly data which we track for percent change in 
the headline index from the start of one quarter to the start of the next.  The finding 
above that the two major indexes of prices are not correlated also prompted us to 
determine in what ways the two are dissimilar – they are likely different in both 
magnitude and in the sign for quarterly values as well.  Both present us with 
interesting macroeconomic expectations.   
 
The movement in the absolute size of the indexes in short-run periods may be 
associated with exogenous events in the economy rather than monetary policy, given 
that the relationship between money and inflation holds over time only and not 
necessarily in any one short-run period.  If the two indexes differ in magnitude then 
we know that something other than monetary factors may explain the movement. 
Given that the government intervenes to stabilize prices for consumers, any large 
swing in the deflator not accompanied by the CPI tells us, again, that an exogenous 
event is likely in play.  The time series quarterly price data in Table 2 show us that 
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the behaviour of prices as measured by the two indexes varies in both sign and in 
magnitude.   
 
The greatest divergence in the indexes occurs in times of uncertainty.  First, 2008 
and early 2009 was the period of the Great Recession of 2007-09 that affected the 
major trading partners of Bahrain in the Americas, Europe, and parts of Asia.  This 
period was also one of great variability in the price of energy that is so essential to 
the Bahraini economy.  Brent crude oil prices, measured quarterly to match the 
quarterly data of the deflator, rose in early 2008 to the highest nominal level ever 
and then fell 63% from the second quarter 2008 high of $121.2 per barrel to $44.52 
in the first quarter of 2009.
4
  Combine this with major swings in the value of the 
U.S. dollar, to which the Bahraini dinar is pegged, and we have two exogenous 
factors that could explain the swings. We would expect that changes in oil prices 
should be positively correlated with the movement in the deflator, and changes in 
the trade weighted value of the dollar should be inversely correlated with the 
deflator.
5
  The expectation is borne out in the quarterly data from 2007 to 2013. One, 
the correlation coefficient between quarter-over-quarter (Q/Q) changes in the 
deflator and Q/Q changes in Brent oil prices is 0.87; the correlation between Q/Q 
changes in the trade-weighted value of the dollar and Q/Q changes in the deflator is 
-0.61.  Not surprisingly, the movement in the value of the dollar and Brent oil prices 
is a solid -0.71.  All of this, point to the role, at least in the short run, of exogenous 
shocks in the price of oil and the value of the US dollar in explaining the swings in 
inflation in Bahrain.    
 
When we get to the Arab Spring in the first quarter of 2011 the divergence is both in 
magnitude and sign once again between the CPI and the deflator.  Our initial 
expectation, given the behaviour in the 2008-09 period, would be to focus on the 
dollar and oil.  What we actually find, however, is unlike the previous period. The 
importance of the unrest is revealed in the following set of observations.  First, we 
find that the change in the trade-weighted value of the dollar was minimal. The 
value of the dollar between 2010Q4 (72.9440) and 2011Q2 (69.5299) dropped a 
relatively small 4.6%.  At the same time the market price for Brent crude oil rose 
substantially, moving 35% higher between the fourth quarter of 2010 and the second 
quarter of 2011. Even West Texas Intermediate rose by 20% in the same period.  
                                                 
4
 Were we to look instead at Brent oil prices on a weekly basis the drop from the first week 
of July to the last week of December 2008 was an astounding 74.9%. 
5
 For an analysis of the connection between oil prices and real exchange rates of oil exporters 
see Al-mulali & Che Sab, 2012.   
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Given the small movement in the dollar’s value plus the normally high correlation 
between oil and the dollar we would expect little change in Brent crude.  As a result 
there should be little change in the deflator in Bahrain.  But oil rose while the dollar 
remained stable. We conclude that a random shock is likely behind this odd 
movement in oil prices, one unrelated to the value of the dollar.  That shock is likely 
the Arab Spring: the unrest unsettled Middle East energy markets, and energy prices 
in general, so highly correlated with the inflation index in Bahrain, rose as a result of 
a price premium for political uncertainty.  What is also interesting in this period is 
the movement in cost of living as measured by the CPI, which was so tame in the 
period leading up to the unrest. The total change in consumer prices from January 
2009 through December 2010 was 2.5%, yet consumer prices fell in the first quarter 
of 2011 by 2.7%, the largest swing positive or negative in any one quarter for which 
we have monthly data. Yet, overall price increases for consumers totalled 5.6% from 
January 2011 to December 2013.  Again, the unusual movement must be tied to 
some exogenous shock, which we would argue was the Arab Spring.  But where in 
the economy was this effect most felt by the citizens?         
 
To establish exactly how the unrest affected the cost of living we can look at the 
movement of the components of the consumer basket of goods.  In August 2007 the 
CIO began to publish monthly figures on CPI. Initially only headline rates were 
reported but starting in January 2009 the reports were expanded to include details on 
a consistent set of categories from the market basket (see Appendix III for the 
categories).  While the time series is not as long as we would need to carry out a 
sophisticated analysis of unusual behaviour during the Arab Spring, we can consider 
the movement of the headline rate and of the components to establish the primary 
side effects of the unrest.  An analysis of the components over time allow us to track 
a change in the relative price of the components as well as pinpoint which 
components were most affected, if any, by the start of unrest.     
   
To isolate the possible causes of the movement in the cost of living around the time 
of the AS we first find which components of the market basket moved the most, 
both up and down.  We do this two ways.  In columns one and two of Table 3 we list 
the largest overall price changes in absolute terms regardless of the weight of the 
sector in the market basket for the period of unrest (February 2011 to December 
2013). In columns three and four we list the largest movers adjusted for weight in 
the market basket as a percent of the total rise in prices over the period of 5.6%. 
Looking at both methods we see that those sectors showing the biggest absolute or 
relative changes in prices have movements that are consistent with the prices being 
influenced by policy makers as much or more than by scarcity or market conditions, 
save one (housing).  Let us focus on recreation, communication, furnishings and 
food.  Recreation prices show the biggest spike in absolute price, but 27.2 
percentage points of the 31.4 percentage point rise, or 87% of the rise, occurred in 
one month between September and October 2011.  The same is true of 
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communication, where 5.8 percentage points of the 5.9 point drop (98%) occurred 
over one month, August to September 2011. Not as pronounced but still unusual, 6.7 
percentage points of the 15.6% rise in the price of furnishings occurred between July 
and August 2011.   
 
To further establish that pricing policy is behind these movements rather than 
scarcity and market conditions let us analyze the food sector a little more closely.  
To do this we will compare the movement in food prices in Bahrain to the 
movement in world food prices on an annual basis as reported by the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.  We would expect food 
prices in Bahrain to be highly correlated with world prices given how little food 
Bahrain itself produces; only 1.79% of the land in Bahrain is arable. The country is 
at the mercy of import prices. Yet, food price movements appear to be uneven and 
unrelated to world prices. The rise in food prices between January and February 
2012 was 8.2%, explaining 95% of the rise over the two-year period of the AS. Over 
the entire period for which we have data, 2009-13, we see that the movement in food 
prices in Bahrain is not related to movement in world prices, as shown in Table 4.  
This unusual behavior, both within Bahrain and relative to world prices, leads us to 
conclude that movements in food and other major components of the cost of living 
must be tied to pricing policy rather than relative scarcity. 
 
There is one sector, however, where this is not the case, and that is housing.  Four 
facts will point to the importance of the onset of unrest in influencing housing prices 
in Bahrain.  One, the change in the housing price index from January 2009 to 
December 2013 was -7.5%.  Two, in the two years prior to the AS the change in the 
price index was only -1.5%.  Three, the change in the housing index between 
February 2011 and December 2013 was -6.1%.  And three, the change in the 
housing index from February 2011, the exact start of the unrest, to March 2011 was 
-14.2%, from an index of 107.9 to 92.6.  These price movements lead us to conclude 
that the most important price effect of the Arab Spring on the Bahraini economy was 
in housing.  The price of housing fell due to the onset of unrest and more than three 
years later (October 2014) prices had not yet recovered.   
 
Conclusion 
The effects of the Arab Spring on the economies of the Middle East had the 
potential to be both varied and widespread.  While earlier research has shown that 
the unrest did in fact drive down GDP and employment growth in Bahrain we 
analyzed what effect the upheaval had on general and relative prices.  We began by 
investigating the measurement and co-movement of two inflation indicators – the 
GDP Deflator and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) - over the period 1990-2011.  
This analysis makes clear that the deflator alone measures inflation in Bahrain; the 
CPI appears to be instead a measure of the cost of living where prices are influenced 
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by government intervention.  The next step was to look at the specific movements in 
the two indexes to determine what non-monetary factors may play a role in the 
movement of general prices both over time and in short periods of uncertainty in 
Bahrain.  The evidence points to the important roles played by the price of oil and 
the trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar. Third, to establish what effects the 
unrest might have had we looked at disaggregated monthly CPI data just before and 
then during the AS to determine the effect on prices in various consumer sectors of 
Bahrain, if any, of the onset of social upheaval.  While the onset of unrest is 
correlated with movements in several components of the CPI index, the AS had its 
most direct and lasting causal effect solely on the housing portion of the consumer 
basket.  Other prices in Bahrain at the consumer level appear to be greatly 
influenced by government policy as much or more by market conditions or growth 
rates in money, consistent with the observation that the CPI is a measure of the cost 
of living only, not a measure of inflation.   
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                                                 APPENDIX 
 
Time Series Data on Inflation, by CPI and Deflator, Annual 
CPI Base year = 2006; Deflator Base Year 2001/2010 
 
Deflator Deflator Current Real
Inflation Using Dinar GDP
Year GDP Inflation CPI Inflation 2010 Base 2010 Base GDP
Deflator  
1989 86.18  
1990 89.04 3.3% 95.90  
1991 87.22 -2.0% 96.00 0.1%
1992 85.93 -1.5% 96.50 0.5%
1993 86.62 0.8% 99.00 2.6%
1994 92.49 6.8% 99.40 0.4%
1995 94.73 2.4% 102.50 3.1%
1996 95.10 0.4% 102.30 -0.2%
1997 96.68 1.7% 104.60 2.2%
1998 89.52 -7.4% 104.20 -0.4%
1999 91.86 2.6% 102.80 -1.3%
2000 105.03 14.3% 93.40 -9.1%
2001 100.00 -4.8% 92.30 -1.2%
2002 101.26 1.3% 91.90 -0.4%
2003 108.39 7.0% 93.40 1.6%
2004 118.26 9.1% 95.50 2.2%
2005 131.36 11.1% 98.00 2.6%
2006 145.10 10.5% 100.00 2.0% 88.58       6,957.90      7,854.50      
2007 157.29 8.4% 103.30 3.3% 8.4% 96.06       8,170.48      8,505.83      
2008 175.22 11.4% 106.90 3.5% 11.4% 106.98    9,667.29      9,036.30      
2009 152.44 -13.0% 109.90 2.8% -13.0% 93.07       8,624.77      9,266.80      
2010 163.72 7.4% 112.10 2.0% 7.4% 100.00    9,668.20      9,668.20      
2011 181.24 10.7% 112.40 0.3% 10.7% 110.63    10,920.60    9,871.20      
2012 185.05 2.1% 115.30 2.6% 2.1% 113.01    11,530.50    10,203.20    
2013 187.82 1.5% 119.90 4.0% 1.5% 114.72    12,328.20    10,746.40    
Avg. Rate 1991-2013 3.5% 1.0%  
 
 
 
Components of the GDP Deflator 
 
Agriculture:  Output is deflated using volume index and Intermediate consumption 
at constant prices is calculated using fixed coefficient to the output. 
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Fishing: Single deflation is used. Output is deflated using volume index and 
Intermediate consumption at constant prices is calculated using fixed coefficient to 
the output. 
 
Mining: The estimates at constant prices are obtained through double deflation using 
volume indicators of production to deflate output at current prices, and a multi index 
of input prices to deflate intermediate consumption. 
 
Quarrying: The estimates at constant prices are obtained through double deflation 
using volume indicators of production to deflate output, and an index of construction 
input materials to deflate the intermediate consumption. 
 
Manufacturing:: The estimates at constant prices are obtained through double and 
single deflation using appropriate volume and price indices (International price 
indices for industry for world wild) for different manufacturing activities. 
 
Electricity: Single deflation is used, gross output is extrapolated using a volume 
index of production and intermediate consumption is taken as a fixed ratio to the 
output. 
Water supply: Single deflation is used, gross output is extrapolated using a volume 
index of production and intermediate consumption is taken as a fixed ratio to the 
output. 
Construction: The constant price estimates are obtained through double deflation 
using the construction cost index (which is a combination of the construction 
material index and the labor cost index). The intermediate consumption is deflated 
using the construction material index. 
 
Wholesale and Retail Trade: To obtain the estimates at constant prices the gross 
output in the various activities is deflated using appropriate price indices, and 
intermediate consumption is deflated using the overall CPI 
 
Hotels: The constant price estimates are obtained through double deflation using a 
room charges index (from the tourism statistics) for deflating gross output, and a 
CPI to deflate intermediate consumption. 
 
Transport and communication: The constant price estimates are obtained through 
double deflation using CPI and volume index for deflating gross output Appropriate 
price indices are used to construct deflator for intermediate consumption such as CPI 
and services price. 
 
Financial intermediation: Gross output is deflated using net interest rate index and a 
CPI to deflate the intermediate consumption. While Constant price estimates of the 
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insurance are compiled by deflating the current price data using single deflator 
(CPI). 
 
Real estate, renting and business activities: The output at the constant price 
estimates are obtained through deflation using average rent index by type dwelling 
and an appropriate sub-indices of the CPI. For intermediate consumption appropriate 
sub-indices of the CPI is used. 
 
Producers of Government Services: The constant price estimates are obtained 
through deflation using wage index and appropriate sub-indices of the CPI to deflate 
the intermediate consumption. 
 
Education: The constant price estimate for the private sector is obtained through 
double deflation using the volume index for output and a appropriate CPI for 
intermediate consumption. For the government estimates are obtained through 
deflation using wage index and appropriate sub-indices of the CPI to deflate the 
intermediate consumption. 
 
Health: The constant price estimate for the private sector is obtained through double 
deflation using the volume index for output and an appropriate CPI for intermediate 
consumption. For the government estimates are obtained through deflation using 
wage index and appropriate sub-indices of the CPI to deflate the intermediate 
consumption. 
 
Other services: The constant price estimates are obtained through deflation using an 
appropriate CPI. 
 
 
 
Components and their Weights of the CPI Market Basket 
Based on Classification of Individual Consumption according to Purpose 
(COICOP) 
Division Base Period Expenditure Weight, in 
percent 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 23.22 
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and 
narcotics 
1.35 
Restaurants and hotels 1.88 
Clothing and footwear 7.74 
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Housing, water, electricity, gas, other 
fuel 
23.96 
Furnishings, household equipment, 
routine maintenance 
8.38 
Transport 12.31 
Communication 2.56 
Education 2.19 
Health 2.19 
Recreation and culture 5.18 
Miscellaneous goods and services 6.09 
 
Table 1 – Inflation, Implied and Actual 
 
Table 2:  The Movement of General Prices, Quarter over Quarter 
 
Year and Quarter CPI Headline 
Inflation, % 
Deflator Inflation, % 
2008Q1 0.6 4.1% 
2008Q2 0.3 13.7% 
2008Q3 2.0 2.1% 
2008Q4 0.5 -15.3% 
2009Q1 0.3 -13.6% 
2009Q2 -0.1 7.1% 
2009Q3 1 3.2% 
2009Q4 0.5 5.2% 
2010Q1 0.3 0.2% 
2010Q2 -0.5 0.0% 
2010Q3 0.9 0.0% 
2010Q4 -0.5 0.0% 
2011Q1 -2.7 7.8% 
Component, 1990-2011 For  M2 For M1 
CCAGR – Money Stock 10.20% 11.06% 
CCAGR – Velocity -1.97% -2.76% 
CCAGR – Real GDP 4.75% 4.75% 
Implied inflation (%ΔM + %ΔV – %Δy) 3.47% 3.55% 
Actual inflation, CPI, using CCAGR 0.76% 0.76% 
Actual inflation, Deflator, using CCAGR 3.67% 3.67% 
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2011Q2 -0.3 4.3% 
2011Q3 1.8 -1.4% 
2011Q4 -1.2 0.4% 
2012Q1 2.1 1.8% 
2012Q2 -0.3 -1.5% 
2012Q3 1.4 1.0% 
2012Q4 -0.3 1.6% 
2013Q1 1.7 -0.1% 
2013Q2 0.2 -1.2% 
2013Q3 0.9 2.0% 
2013Q4 -0.1 1.0 
 
Table 3:  Major Price Movers in the Cost of Living, Feb. 2011 – Dec. 2013 
 
Consumer Sector Percent Rise or Fall in 
Prices in a Sector, 
Independent of  
Weight in Market 
Basket 
Consumer Sector Percent 
Contribution to the 
5.6% Rise in Cost 
of Living, Adjusted 
by Weight in 
Market Basket 
Recreation +31.4% Food +37% 
Alcohol +24.3% Recreation +30% 
Furnishings +15.6% Furnishings +24% 
Misc. 
Goods/Services 
+13.7% Misc. 
Goods/Services 
+15% 
Education +10.1% Education +8% 
Food +8.6% Alcohol +6% 
Restaurants +4.5% Clothing +4% 
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Clothing +3.1% Transportation +2% 
Healthcare +2.5% Restaurants +2% 
Transportation +1.0% Healthcare +1% 
Communication -5.9% Communication -3% 
Housing  -6.1% Housing -27% 
 
Table 4: Movement in Food Prices, World versus Bahrain 
Year Change in FAO Food Price 
Index, from the year before 
Change in Bahraini Food Price 
Index from the year before 
2010 +17.2% +4.8% 
2011 +22.3% +2.0% 
2012 -7.3% +4.1% 
2013 -1.6% +2.3% 
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